Introduction
The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to measure network performance parameters such as latency, bandwidth, and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of network measurement results, security aspects must be considered. Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement results may be violated. For example, if no protection is provided, an adversary in the middle may modify packet timestamps, thus altering the measurement results.
The currently-standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism [RFC4656] [RFC5357] requires that endpoints (i.e. both the client and the server) possess a shared secret. In today's network deployments, however, the use of pre-shared keys is far from optimal. For example, in wireless infrastructure networks, certain network elements, which can be seen as the two endpoints from an O/TWAMP This document specifies a method for enabling network measurements between a TWAMP client and a TWAMP server, as discussed in Section 3. In short, the shared key used for securing TWAMP traffic is derived from IKEv2 [RFC7296] . From an operations and management perspective [RFC5706] , the mechanism described in this document requires that both the TWAMP Control-Client and Server support IPsec. IKEv2-derived keys SHOULD be used instead of shared secrets when O/ TWAMP is employed in a deployment using IKEv2.
After clarifying the terminology and scope in the subsequent sections, the remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 4 summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security. Section 5 presents the method for binding TWAMP and IKEv2 for network measurements between the client and the server which both support IKEv2. Finally, Section 6 discusses the security considerations arising from the proposed mechanisms.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. In the unauthenticated mode, the security parameters are left unused.
In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the security parameters are negotiated during the control connection establishment. The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key are generated randomly by the Control-Client. The HMAC Session-key is communicated along with the AES Session-key during O/TWAMP-Control connection setup. The HMAC Session-key is derived independently of the AES Session-key.
O/TWAMP-Test Security
The O/TWAMP-Test protocol runs over UDP, using the Session-Sender and Session-Reflector IP and port numbers that were negotiated during the 
O/TWAMP Security Root
As discussed above, the AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key used by the O/TWAMP-Test protocol are derived from the AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key which are used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol. The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol are generated randomly by the Control-Client, and encrypted with the shared secret associated with KeyID. Therefore, the security root is the shared secret key. Thus, for large deployments, key provision and management may become overly complicated.
Comparatively, a certificate-based approach using IKEv2 can automatically manage the security root and solve this problem, as we explain in Section 5.
O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks
This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network measurements between a client and a server which both support IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is derived using IKEv2 [RFC7296] .
Shared Key Derivation
In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA can be created without generating any child SA is possible [RFC6023] .
When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be generated first. SK_d must be computed as per [RFC7296] . The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:
Shared secret key = prf( SK_d, "IPPM" )
Wherein the string "IPPM" is encoded in ASCII and "prf" is a pseudorandom function.
It is recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec layer so that IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP client. Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and IPsec layers is host-internal and implementation-specific. Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server. That said, one possible way could be the following: at the ControlClient side, the IPSec layer can perform a lookup in the Security Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the Server and thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the Server side, the IPSec layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs) sent by the Control-Client (see Section 5.3), and therefore extract the shared secret key.
In case that both client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered. First, the O/TWAMP Control-Client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode which supports IKEv2. Alternatively, the O/TWAMP Control-Client does not initiate the establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational management purposes, and proceeds with the modes defined in [RFC4656] [RFC5357] [RFC5618] . Again, although both alternatives are feasible, they are in fact implementation-specific.
If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA MUST continue to be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.
Server Greeting Message Update
To trigger a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2 and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, the Modes field in the Server Greeting Message (Figure 2 ) will need to allow for support of key derivation as discussed in Section 5.1. Therefore, when this method is used, the Modes value extension MUST be supported. Support for deriving the shared key from the IKEv2 SA is indicated by setting IKEv2Derived (see Section 7). 
Security Considerations
As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key derivation algorithm strength and limitations are as per [RFC7296] .
The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by the random number generator employed. The strength of all keys and implementation vulnerabilities, particularly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are as defined in [RFC7296] .
IANA Considerations
During the production of this document, the authors and reviewers noticed that the TWAMP-Modes registry, which should describe a bitfield of flags, instead is defined as a registry of integer values. In addition, the Semantics Definition column seems to have spurious information in it. The registry should be changed to correct these issues, as follows: ------------------------------------------|------------|-------- (where RFCxxxx refers to draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec). 
--|-------------------------------------------|------------|---------

